Towards a metaphysical neutrality of the neurophenomenological and neurophilosophical approaches of consciousness study

Abstract

There are specific correlations between principles of neurophenomenological and neurophilosophical approaches regarding problematic nature of the world beyond phenomenological attitude and principled indirectness of data about the prototype of an inner model of the objective world, constructed at a neural level. Such understanding by itself demands rejection of the compromised natural (not neutral) ontological assumptions about consciousness and acceptance of the metaphysically neutral structural-ontological attitude, when study of consciousness is concerned. That methodological stance naturally correlates with a phenomenological attitude of neurophenomenology and with the presupposition of the necessity of objective world of neurophilosophy. This homomorphism is a crucial presupposition of the constructing of the non-reductive theory of consciousness on the metatheoretical system basis, which is our future concern.